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Conclusion 
The recent economic and financial crises have nurtured new attention towards the related governmental 
financial responses among financial management scholars, and to the role of management capacities in 
facing and absorbing shocks among organization scholars. This book suggests that looking at the recent crises 
through the conceptual lens of resilience may help bridge the gap between these two research streams and 
provide lessons of general and long-term relevance on how governments face shocks that affect their 
financial conditions. Moreover, it highlights how the evolutionary and dynamic perspective offered by 
resilience (Davoudi, Brooks, and Mehmood 2013, Sutcliffe and Vogus 2003) may contribute to enrich and 
integrate the insights coming from financial management and organizational literatures on how governments 
deal with financial shocks and disturbances. 
The resurgence of scholarly interest towards governmental financial crises is due to a number of factors, 
including not only the sovereign debt crises, but also the increasing number of bankruptcies in local 
authorities and, more generally, the conditions of cutback management that are striking many public sector 
organizations. This has encouraged reflections on how to predict and detect fiscal distress (for example, 
Hendrick, 2004; Kloha et al. 2005; Trussel and Patrick 2009; Maher and Deller 2010; Garcia-Sanchez et al. 
2012), as well as on how austerity is being tackled by governments (Hendrick, 2011; Klase 2011; Dougherty 
and Klase 2009; Bozeman 2010; Maher and Deller 2010; Pandey 2010; Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010; Baker 
2011; West and Condrey 2011; Sacco et al. 2011; Cepiku and Bonomi Savignon, 2012; Raudla et al., 2013). 
However, this literature tends to overlook the organizational conditions, capacities and histories that may 
affect reactions to crises. The adoption of a long term, strategic view on the whole life-cycle of public 
organizations requires exploring not only actions and reactions to crises and shocks, but also how pre-existing 
conditions and capacities affect decisions and actions (see also Barbera et al., 2016). In the light of these 
considerations, authors contributing to this book used the dimensions of the resilience framework, i.e. 
financial shocks, vulnerability, anticipatory capacity and coping capacity, to explore these aspects. The results 
show that the financial management arena appears to be particularly suited for studying resilience at a time 
where fiscal stress and shocks are of particular significance.  
Though it may be too ambitious to summarize the richness of experiences emerging from the country 
chapters in a few lines, in this concluding chapter we attempt a short synthesis and interpretation, searching 
for different approaches to resilience and the underlying contextual and organizational explanatory variables. 
In doing so, we summarize what we have learned about the financial resilience of local governments across 
eleven countries and discuss possible developments and future research avenues.  
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Country settings and the role of the external environment 
Across the world, countries have been affected by the global financial crisis differently, and thus have also  
responded to the related challenges in in distinctive ways (Lodge and Hood 2012; Peters 2011). In order to 
account for this variety, our book takes into consideration local governments in eleven countries, which are 
characterized by different administrative systems (Meyer and Hammerschmid 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2011), local government profiles (Wolman 2014), as well as strategies in responding to the financial crisis.  
While the financial crisis – in some way - impacted most of the countries included in this book, the effects on 
local governments were not uniform, with some being affected immediately and/or more substantially than 
others, partly due to the proximity of the crisis, the natural effects of pre-existing fiscal profiles and 
intergovernmental relations or national coping policies.  
In this regard, the centrally-defined policies for local governments, including fiscal arrangements (i.e. the 
structure, basis, and controllability of major revenue sources, debt rules, investment guidelines, monitoring 
systems, tax limits), appear to have influenced not only the impact, but also the range of possible fiscal 
responses to the financial and economic crisis. Local governments in several countries (e.g. France, England, 
Italy, Greece, The Netherlands, US) had to deal with national governments intentionally cutting back or 
delaying subnational transfers/grants. The latter was regarded as particularly problematic in contexts where 
the local level’s fiscal autonomy (level of own revenues sources, tax base, tax scope) was described as low 
and strict spending limits as well as debt rules were in force, resulting in expenditure reductions putting great 
pressure on local governments. Indeed, local governments in most countries have limited financial autonomy 
(see Sweden and Greece as exceptions), with some of them (e.g. Austria, US) being (heavily) dependent on 
shared tax arrangements, where local governments suffer when tax revenues as a result of economic crisis 
decrease in general. The loss of flexibility in revenues through tax limits on or removal of local taxes 
mandated by upper government levels was also described as a great challenge, or even perceived as a shock 
(e.g. France, Italy, Australia, and Germany). 
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While national policies constrained local governments’ responses both on the revenue as well as the 
expenditure side, crisis-related factors (e.g. unemployment,) automatically triggered expenditure increases 
in areas where local governments are directly responsible, such as social care services. Only in a few cases, 
increased expenditures were buffered through increased grants from the national level (e.g. Sweden), while 
in others they had to be carried by local governments themselves (Italy, Germany), even in a context of 
decreasing own revenues (e.g. local taxes) and/or transfers. In a number of countries, services were 
transferred from the central or regional government to the local level with inadequate or no funding support 
at all (e.g. Austria, Italy, England). It became also evident that in some contexts, regulations or guidelines 
seem to have fostered the institutionalisation of stronger capacities across cases, thus better equipping the 
investigated local governments to anticipate or to cope with possible shocks (England, The Netherlands, 
Victoria in Australia) while reverse effects are shown in others (Brazil, Greece, New South Wales in Australia).  
Not unexpectedly, the role of the external environment, and especially of national policies, emerged as 
relevant from the interviews. Thus, the economic, socio-demographic and institutional features of the 
environment affected LG’s resilience differently, therefore not only supporting calls for considering 
environmental factors in empirical resilience research (Linnenluecke 2015, Darnhofer 2014) but also 
confirming their importance shown in financial management and organization literature (Hendrick 2011, 
Boyne and Meier 2009). However, the analysis also highlights that environmental features per se are not 
sufficient in explaining patterns of LGs’ financial resilience over time.  
 
What did we learn about government financial resilience? Cross-boundary financial resilience patterns 
Most of the country chapters focused on the fortunes of four local government cases. Using the dimensions 
of the proposed resilience framework, i.e. financial shocks, vulnerability, anticipatory capacity and coping 
capacity, the authors provide a vivid picture of how local governments respond to shocks in their financial 
environment over time. Herein, financial shocks represent any unexpected external event that has significant 
impact on the finances of a local government. During the investigated period, the most relevant external 
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shocks quoted by the interviewees were mainly related to the financial crisis (and its aftermath), including 
shrinking revenue bases, significant reductions in transfers/grants, increased demand for social support, etc. 
Vulnerability is interpreted as the perceived exposure to shocks, i.e. the level and sources of vulnerability 
and their development over time. Anticipatory capacities refer to the availability of tools and capabilities that 
enable organisations to better identify and manage their vulnerabilities and to recognize potential financial 
shocks before they arise, as well as their nature, likelihood, timing, scale and potential impacts. Coping 
capacities refer to resources and abilities that allow shocks to be faced and vulnerabilities to be managed. 
The latter comprise abilities to buffer, adapt and transform (see also Béné et al.2012; Darnhofer 2014; 
Davoudi, Brooks, and Mehmood 2013; Folke et. al. 2010), which are not mutually exclusive but can be 
deployed in conjunction with each other.  
The analysis conducted across the 45 local governments (five in Germany and four in the other ten countries 
respectively) shows that resilience can take different forms, but that important commonalities can be 
identified across countries. Indeed, the patterns of resilience identified in the analysis are spread across 
countries with no single pattern being associated with any one country. Resilience therefore encompasses 
diversity, while the different paths and patterns associated with it can be thought of as a universal concept. 
This reveals that there is no one single approach to resilience and that organisations have the choice, based 
on their latent capacities and the how they perceive their vulnerability in the face of a crisis, as to which 
pathway they follow.  
The different patterns of financial resilience that emerge from the analysis: self-regulative/pro-active 
adaptation patterns, constrained adaptation patterns, reactive adaptation patterns, and patterns that can 
be classed as powerlessness and contentedness, can be interpreted as the result of the dynamic interplay 
among the dimensions of anticipatory capacity, coping capacity, financial shocks as well as the associated 
vulnerability to them: Each pattern is described below. 
Self-regulation/Pro-active adaptation. The local governments showing this pattern of behavior are able to 
look at shocks as opportunities for improvement, and thus appear proactive in responding to them. This 
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includes adopting wide-ranging measures and being ready to adapt or transform to reduce expenditure, 
reconfigure service delivery and find alternative sources of income. In short, these local governments appear 
to be able to internally develop, over time, self-regulating capacities that allow them to more successfully 
react to shocks, employing the full range of coping capacities. Reactions are, thus, based on existing 
competences and resources as well as exploring new alternatives (e.g., innovation, networking). The nature 
of these organisations means that they already had good anticipatory and coping capacities in place before 
the crisis, which in turn resulted in a good understanding of their relative vulnerability leading to lower levels 
of vulnerability at the start of the period. What differentiates this group from other adaptive types is a belief 
in their ability to manage not only their internal capacities, but to also their ability to use and shape the 
external environment to generate opportunities for income creation, demand management, and service 
delivery. For example, as shown in the case of Municipality D in France and Sesto San Giovanni in Italy, self-
regulating/pro-actively adapting local governments put in place strategic processes and took a long term 
view across a variety of fronts. In others, this approach was nothing new and had, as was the case for M4 in 
the US, Manchester in England and the Swedish S2 and S4, been built up in response to previous crises, 
allowing these local governments to operate from a position of strength in terms of being able to draw on a 
range of pre-existing capacities.  
Constrained adaptation. This smaller group (differs from the self-regulatory/proactive adaptation group as 
local governments herein are either unable to control their own destiny or have not yet reached a position 
where they are able to do so. They are constantly and proactively adapting, but are constrained by external 
forces, usually exerted by upper levels of government. Even though they do not perceive their environment 
as being as controllable as their self-regulating peers, this group differs from the reactive adapter group as, 
in line with the self-regulators, they see shocks as opportunities and have in place, or are able to develop, a 
range of capacities that allow them to continually change and adapt. Despite this optimistic outlook, there is 
a danger that under prolonged periods of financial strain, and as perceptions regarding their long term 
vulnerability worsen, there could be a tendency to slip into a more fatalistic mode, as shown in the case of 
Loddonshire in Australia and Wigan in England. Alternatively, this group may try to break free of the 
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constraints and attempt to seek a more self-regulating path in the longer term, something that Derbyshire in 
England was discussing at the time of the interviews. 
Reactive adaptation. Within this pattern, local governments have learned to deal with austerity largely by 
adapting to changed circumstances in their environment. The nature of adaptation here appears to be 
diverse and could extend to both anticipatory and coping capacities, with a consequential impact on 
respective vulnerabilities. Local governments in this group are characterized by both an acceptance of the 
need to adapt to changing circumstances as well as the implementation of actions to do so - aspects that 
clearly distinguish them from more fatalist responses that are sometimes exhibited in the final two groups. 
Reactive adapters can also be differentiated from the other, constrained or self-regulative/proactive adaptive 
types, as they appear to need triggers to activate the deployment or building of capacities. Local governments 
across this pattern entered the crisis period with varying levels of vulnerability and anticipatory capacity. 
Rather than having a strong set of anticipatory capacities from the start, the impact of the crisis took some 
in this group by surprise and as such they did not, at least initially, fully comprehend the extent of their 
vulnerability. In one case, M3 in the US, which was temporally closer to the onset of the crisis than other 
countries, even negated early warnings and did not appreciate the potential magnitude of the crisis. Others, 
such as Ede and Hengelo in The Netherlands, appear to have had medium anticipatory abilities. In either 
case, these tend to have been strengthened through investment in the aftermath of the crisis. There is also 
a propensity to engage in coping capacities that go beyond simple buffering, resulting in either adaptive or 
possibly moves towards transformative capability. In fact, there are a wide range of coping capacities 
displayed across this group with some focusing on retrenchment (buffering/downsizing) (e.g. Brazil 2, US 1, 
Germany 1) while others seek to reposition themselves in more comprehensive ways (e.g. Austria 2, Brazil 3, 
B4, France 3, Germany 3, Sweden 3, US 3), possibly putting them in a stronger position should another crisis 
occur in the near future. This developmental/progression characteristic perhaps also reflects the typical 
experience of Swedish local governments, which had already been through a major trauma earlier in their 
lifecycles that left them better prepared to respond to the recent global financial crisis.  
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Powerlessness. Here, the financial crisis would seemingly exceed the threshold of local governments’ existing 
capacities, leading to a perception of powerlessness and forcing them into a fatalist mode, i.e. a day-by-day 
management of emergencies, leaving them highly reliant on buffering capacities, externally driven and 
constrained by external pressures. Although the anticipatory capacity may be expected to increase over time, 
such cases (e.g. Rozzano Italy and the French FA and FB), respond with rather passive behavior, and an 
orientation towards buffering capacities may prevail. Such local governments may be less willing to take 
ownership of necessary changes, deflecting issues back onto national governments and postponing solutions. 
The lack of both anticipatory and coping capacities could lead to such local governments having a poor 
understanding of their vulnerabilities, leaving them highly vulnerable at the beginning of the crisis and 
remaining vulnerable at the end. Such an approach is not sustainable against protracted, deep and enduring 
financial cuts. Indeed, at least one local government that appears to operate under this pattern of resilience 
(Central Darling Shire in Australia), has come under intense governmental scrutiny and has been placed into 
an extended period of financial administration. There is a risk therefore that adopting such an approach in 
the wrong conditions is not merely fatalist, but fatal and could lead to an even higher vulnerability to future 
shocks. 
Contentedness. For this group, we see some local governments that were relatively wealthy and therefore 
not particularly vulnerable at the onset of the crisis. Such local governments  may be expected to have weak 
anticipatory capacities as their relative wealth has meant they have never had to face a significant financial 
crisis before, being either immune to shocks, or being able to absorb them comfortably should they occur. 
Furthermore, their favorable environmental conditions may have encouraged them to downplay emerging 
and increasing vulnerabilities and to not invest in building anticipatory and coping capacities as their still 
wealthy conditions and context offset extant anticipatory and coping weaknesses(as was the case for A3/A4 
in Austria, GB/ GD from Greece, AUS 4 and I4). In short, they would appear to behave like contented 
organizations, which, resting on their laurels, had not anticipated the crisis, hoping to weather the storm 
relying on their buffering capacities. In the long term however, this may translate into increased vulnerability 
and the need to take stronger actions in developing anticipatory coping capacities.  
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Final remarks 
Looking at 45 local governments across eleven countries, this book provides a testimony on how local 
governments around the globe are trying hard to keep providing services to their local communities while 
fighting shocks, austerity and difficulties. The authors of the country chapters offer us a picture that is at the 
same time worrying and reassuring. Providing public services to local communities, far from being an ordinary 
task, is becoming an increasingly extraordinary challenge, the more so under the strain caused by rising 
unemployment and migration, continuously changing national policies, hard central constraints, and cutting 
back of resources. Seen from the outside, and coupled with mere figures of debt, deficits, and financial cuts, 
or aseptic descriptions of the local government field, this may sound discouraging. But it would also be too 
simplistic. The authors of the chapters in this book have not stopped at the door of the local governments 
they are describing. They have fully engaged with them, talking with people and listening to their perceptions 
about the everyday challenges they face, but also of the ways in which day by day they try to anticipate and 
cope with them. This allowed them to offer us a richer, nuanced and probably more encouraging picture. 
Their accounts show that many local governments either had already in place capacities to anticipate and 
cope with the crises, or were prompted by the crisis to put in place measures to strengthen them. The crisis 
has surely put them to the test, but has also triggered paths of development of internal capacities and 
reflections on how to improve the status quo. Thus, financial resilience is not an alien concept to local 
government. Rather it is a way of being and behaving that needs to be better understood, explored and 
highlighted, so as to share possible lessons to learn for the future, or for other local governments that are 
struggling against similar challenges. Indeed, the study also highlighted cases of limited awareness of the 
importance of investing on internal capacities, or awareness of difficulties coupled with a pessimistic 
disposition towards fatalism. In this respect, we hope that this book will help to raise stronger awareness of 
the importance not only of a conducive institutional and economic environment, but also of nurturing, 
maintaining and leveraging capacities for anticipation, adaptation, and transformation.  
It would be unfair and naïve to reduce the richness and variety that emerges from each country chapter to a 
number of abstract and aseptic tables and graphs, or a list of lessons to learn. As such, the reader will need 
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to read the accounts presented in each chapter to capture the whole spectrum and depth of the experiences 
that we are pleased to host in this book. Nevertheless, while each chapter tells us a rich and unique story 
about each country and the selected municipalities, as editors of the book we are required to draw a few 
concluding remarks, referring to the main messages that have emerged.    
As we suggested above, financial resilience proved a useful concept to capture ways of being and behaving 
of local governments in the face of difficult times, for several reasons. 
First, it allows for a more integrative view of local public finances that focuses not only on pressures and 
stimuli coming from the external environment, and on financial data, but also a view more focused on 
organizational pre-conditions and capacities. As such, financial resilience requires us to jointly consider 
external and internal factors, as well as their interaction. It is not enough to focus solely on traditional 
financial measures to analyse and predict organisational success or failure in response to crises, but it is also 
necessary to get underneath the internal capacities and capabilities that act as shaping forces within 
organisations. 
Second, it pointed to the need to recognize that capacities and organizational contingencies are continuously 
in flux, and interact with each other and with external factors over time. It is thus necessary to avoid simplistic 
and deterministic views on cause-effect relationships (such as, the crisis will cause cuts in services, or will 
translate into the development of coping capacities), while being aware that a number of possible paths of 
developments are available, depending on the interactions of a number of factors. However, while the 
analysis revealed that specific types of capacities are complementary and appear to reinforce each other, 
reducing perceived financial vulnerability through heavy exploitation of buffering capacities may crowd out 
the development of other capacities needed evolve in response to the crisis, resulting in higher levels of 
vulnerability over time (Davoudi, Brooks, and Mehmood 2013; Meier and O’Toole 2009; Wildavsky 1988). In 
sum, the analysis points to the importance of the evolutionary and dynamic perspective of resilience and 
hence of looking at configurations of capacities over time, rather than statically focusing on some of them at 
a specific point in time. Financial resilience must therefore be seen as a dynamic concept.  
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Third, and following on from the above, there is not a single type of resilience. The analysis shows that there 
may be different ways of being financially resilient, resulting from different combinations of anticipatory, 
buffering, adapting and transforming capacities, perceived sources and levels of vulnerability, and the 
external environment. Interestingly, a central role in “mediating” among the different dimensions is 
represented by the processes through which people in the organizations filter and interpret internal and 
external conditions, and how they make sense of them (Weick 1988, Weick and Sutfcliffe 2007. In this 
respect, the type of path of progress or regression in internal capacities in the face of crises will also depend 
on how people see and interpret the crises, existing conditions, and the future possibilities of actions. Crises 
cannot only be seen as triggers for change, but also as mirrors, which prompt organizations to reveal their 
capacities and attitudes. Along these lines, the stories told in this book tell us that local governments 
continuously struggle to find an equilibrium between financial and non-financial goals, pressures from the 
external environment and organisational resources, capacities and responses. For some, this resulted in more 
active and adaptive paths of resilience, whereas for others they were, at least initially, passive and non-
adaptive.  
The findings also have some broader implications for both regulators and local authorities. The analysis shows 
that local authorities’ approaches to financial resilience are significantly affected by central government’s 
policies. Thus, policy makers have a strong responsibility in affecting responses to crises. In some of the cases 
analyzed, legislative uncertainty and the current re-centralization of funding and decision making processes 
appear to seriously restrict and jeopardize variety in municipal responses, and at the same time provide 
scapegoats for local authorities to elude and postpone the solutions of problems. Thus, relatively stable and 
at the same time empowering financial policies may be desirable to ensure self-responsible behaviors of local 
authorities. In this regard, the analysis shows that research is also needed to determine what characteristics 
of accounting, control and reporting systems may enhance financial resilience. 
There are a number of ways in which the reflection suggested in this book could be enriched in the future. 
This book focused on eleven countries across Europe, the American continent and Oceania, with a 
predominance of the former, but we may need to know more about other continents (Asia, Africa), or 
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countries (for example, other South American countries, or Eastern European ones). Also, it looked at 
resilience at the local government level, but it would be interesting to expand the analysis to other levels of 
governments, including intermediate, central or even supra-national ones, and to the interrelationships 
among them. Another possible way to further develop the analysis is to complement it by adopting different 
methods, such as surveys or more generally quantitative analyses. Moreover, while we focused on financial 
resilience, it would be important to better explore the complex links between financial and non-financial 
resilience, and between governmental and community resilience. While this book specifically focused on the 
global financial crisis and the related austerity context, it would be interesting to see to what extent and how 
the lessons learned there can be extended to new shocks and difficulties looming ahead for governments, 
including migration movements, populism and the unexpected results of elections and referenda, as well as 
terrorist attacks.  
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